corresponding reduction in commissioning of lieutenants set the stage for 65% manning of the mid-grade officer ranks within National Guard formations. The transformation from a legacy heavy formation to a lighter modular force, a growth in MTOE field grade officer requirements, and attrition of midgrade officers have combined to create unfavorable conditions for high quality mid-grade officers (captains and majors). Even though the Texas Army National Guard (TXARNG) has met 95% (or better) of its mobilizing unit officer requirements, it has not positioned itself to meet the future midgrade officer requirements. This Strategy Research Project (SRP) explores the current challenges faced by leadership to expand the mid-grade officer corps while simultaneously improving the quality and professionalism of those officers. Absent a shift in emphasis and adjustment of systems to reinforce the change, the quality of the field grade officer corps will continue to suffer, and unit effectiveness, morale, trust, retention, and commitment will continue to be significantly degraded.
THE EMPTY BENCH: FUTURE LEADERS OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
In short, Army leaders in this century need to be pentathletes, multi-skilled leaders who can thrive in uncertain and complex operating environments... innovative and adaptive leaders who are expert in the art and science of the profession of arms. The Army needs leaders who are decisive, innovative, adaptive, culturally astute, effective communicators and dedicated to life-long learning. or ROTC, it created significant vacancies in the captain and major ranks.
As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq move into their eight and six years respectively, the TXARNG has maintained good enlisted retention; however, it has struggled with midgrade officers. Second and third deployments have severely impacted the retention of promising mid-grade officers, and has discouraged active duty officers who complete the Reserve Component Transition (RST) program to remain in the TXARNG past their initial service obligation. Even though the TXARNG has met 95% or better of its mobilizing unit officer requirements, current practices may not be adequate to meet the future mid-grade officer demands. "Developing the next generation of leaders is arguably the most important legacy that senior leaders leave to the Army-we talk it, but don't do it." 14 Absent a shift in emphasis and adjustment of systems to reinforce the change, the officer corps will continue to suffer, and unit effectiveness, morale, trust, retention, and commitment will also continue to be significantly degraded.
To see this issue in its broader context, it is necessary to examine the pipeline that feeds the TXARNG Officer corps. There are currently three methods for generating force units will, at a minimum, flat-line current accession of ROTC graduates to the ARNG. 17 Based on past performance and utilizing current methodologies, Army ROTC programs will most likely not increase production to meet the need for officers for all three components; at least not unless Cadet Command makes significant upgrades to the current program or the Army increases the size of the Generating Force. LTC Chaney said it is a great option for potential recruits whose primary goal is becoming an officer. Currently, this option is less monetarily competitive because it has only a $10,000 bonus after officers complete Basic Officer Leader Course III, and requires the recruiter to complete additional paperwork to include the individual's security clearance. LTC Chaney said the alternate Course of Action (COA) is to complete a normal enlistment and then track the soldier for OCS. Advantages of this COA include more money during the first year of enlistment, $15,000 more in bonuses and pay over a four year period, and a reduction in the commitment to enlistment time.
The major disadvantage is that it increases the likelihood that the organization will lose track of the soldier's desire to attend OCS. 24 Both methods of recruiting potential officer candidates "treat the symptoms rather than the cause" and, as illustrated in Figure 4 , are not likely to meet the projected OCS officer production required to sustain formations of the TXARNG. Both attributes are difficult to measure with a test or through an application process; however, the OCS program is designed to eliminate individuals who lack strong character or the physical presence "to meet the Army challenges in the dangerous and complex security environment we face." 32 FM 6-22 also places great importance on intellectual capacity which can be transitioned to a college degree. Why is a college degree 33 and scholarly attributes important? First, a college degree is required for continued promotion. Second, and most importantly, it usually demonstrates an individual's desire for self-development and potential for progressively more complex and higher -level assignments. 34 .
The final ingredient in building a healthy officer corps is ethnic diversity. "Diversity is not an end, but a means by which we make our Army stronger." 35 The TXARNG is not commissioning or assessing sufficient Hispanic lieutenants in order to diversify the force and mirror the Texas population by the year 2020. Currently, Hispanics comprise approximately 4,613 or 23.7% of TXARNG Soldiers. 36 As Figure 5 illustrates, the TXARNG does not have an ethnically balanced officer corps. What are the yearly OCS commissioning requirements? The TXARNG has a requirement for no less than 100 newly commissioned officers annually to meet the unit demands. 40 Communicating the Change Vision.
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The first step to organizational change is establishing a sense of urgency.
"Establishing a sense of urgency is crucial to gaining needed cooperation. With complacency high, transformation usually goes nowhere because few people are even interested in working on the change problem." 47 The unprecedented success in enlisted recruiting masked the shortage of mid-grade officers leading individuals in the organization to believe there is no crisis with mid-grade officers. To create a sense of urgency, senior leaders must acknowledge the mid-grade officer situation. To achieve this understanding, this SRP recommends a five to seven minute video narrated by the Commanding General. This video should have three goals. First, remind TXARNG senior leaders that the mid-grade officer corps is the organization's Center of Gravity, and that failure in this area could have major long term strategic impact. Second, establish the following strategic officer commissioning goals.
 Commission 100 lieutenants in the state OCS Program each FY.
 Graduate state OCS classes that more closely mirrors the diversity of Texas (see Figure 5 , page 14).
 Begin each state OCS class with a mix of 76% OCS Enlistment Option and 24% In Unit Option.
Finally, provide a positive message with the appropriate command emphasis in order to create the sense of urgency required to close the capability gap between current force structure and mid-grade officer manning.
The second step to organizational change is to develop a Vision and Strategy.
FM 3-0 defines Commander's visualization as "the mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning the broad sequence of events by which the force will achieve that end state." 48 The continued As stated above, the OCS commissioning sources must provide no less than 100 new lieutenants each fiscal year, but these numbers do not appear to be feasible given the current operations of the existing R&R and OCS battalions. Therefore, these organizations must change so that they are designed to meet the stated strategic goals.
Recommendations are provided below to accomplish these objectives. 
Conclusion
The Center of Gravity for the TXARNG is its mid grade officer corps (captains and majors). Mid-grade officers are critical to the future development of the organization and are "the source of power that provides…freedom of action, or will to act." 63 The TXARNG is at risk of losing its freedom of action because it has not made the organizational changes required to commission sufficient lieutenants through the state OCS Program. As we approach the year 2020 and the state's population continues to grow, the TXARNG will shoulder an increased burden for the defense of our Nation.
Proverbs 29:18 states "Where there is no vision, the people perish." 64 The leadership for the TXARNG is at a decisive threshold in implementing strategies to close the gap between current force structure and mid-grade officer manning. Without a vision for this strategy, the quality and quantity of the mid-grade officer corps will continue to deteriorate, and soldiers will be led by marginal officers.
This Strategy Research Project has provided a comprehensive analysis of the challenges associated with commissioning adequate lieutenants who have the knowledge, skills, and abilities to thrive in uncertain and complex operating environments. The recruiting and commissioning of an ethnically diverse officer corps is critical to filling the current 392 captain and major vacancies in the TXARNG. With a shift in emphasis, resources, and lasting organizational cultural change, the TXARNG can meet its three strategic officer commissioning goals and have a bench filled with qualified mid-grade officers that mirrors the Texas population by the year 2020. Absent this shift in emphasis and adjustment of systems to reinforce the change, the officer corps will continue to suffer, and unit effectiveness, morale, trust, retention, and commitment will also continue to be significantly degraded. 6 The TXARNG G1 (Chief of Personnel) Section manages the majority of officer and warrant officer actions after he/she is accessed into the TXARNG. This section develops policy and monitors implementation of officer and warrant officer: selection boards (promotion, schooling, and command), reduction boards, separations, evaluations, retention and loss management, branching and rebranching, and selective continuation and retirement. This description is from personal experience of the author while assigned as the Texas Military Force J1 in 2006-2007. 7 The Texas Joint Military Forces Education Office services the soldiers and airmen of the Texas Military Forces. This office assists soldiers and airmen from the initial entry level education counseling stage all the way to successful completion of a masters or professional degree. Along with counseling, the office provides funding to pay for soldiers and airmen education through both federal and state tuition assistance programs, as well as helping with VA educational benefits earned as members of the Texas Military Forces. The TXJMF education Office provides professional and timely assistance to soldiers and airmen in pursuit of a higher education. The Texas Joint Military Forces Education Office Home Page, http://www.agd.state.tx.us/education/education_files/Page1713.htm (accessed March 22, 2009). 8 The Recruiting and Retention Battalion is the TXARNG Commanding General's full-time recruiting and retention force. This organization is responsible for recruiting enlisted soldiers (non-prior service and prior service), officers and warrant officers, and special branched officers (medical, JAG, etc). They have primary responsibility for retention of soldiers from the point of entry until they have completed training and retention (technical oversight) for soldiers after initial entry training. This description is from personal experience of the author while assigned as the Recruiting and Retention Battalion Commander (2002) (2003) (2004) .
